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Judicial Authority in the United States 
By: Christina Syriani 
Abstract 
Throughout U.S. history, the Judicial Branch has issued controversial rulings that have had large 
implications on society. As Supreme Court rulings have the potential to become law, there has been 
much dispute surrounding the scope of their analytical approach, resulting in an “originalist” view that 
competes with the case for a “living constitution.” This piece contemplates these two leading schools of 
thought, comparing and contrasting each argument with the Federalist and Anti-Federalist sentiments 
from the 18th century in an attempt to build a comprehensive picture that might help us understand 
how the founding fathers hoped the Constitution would be employed by the U.S. Supreme Court for 
years to come. 
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 In American political thought and dialogue, there remains an ongoing debate over the role and 
authority of a Supreme Court Justice in the federal judiciary. In 1997, former Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia published an essay defending one position, the originalist argument, whereas former 
Justice Stephen Breyer is a modern spokesperson of the contenting position for an evolving or “living” 
U.S. Constitution, which utilizes an approach of “active liberty.” Justice Scalia and other originalists 
prefer to rely strictly on the dictates of the Constitution as they apply to cases brought before the 
Supreme Court and choose to refrain from exerting judicial authority over political matters, while, on 
the other hand, Justice Breyer acknowledges the significance of Constitutional language but deviates 
from the former as needed, weighing a multitude of factors applicable to the matter before rendering a 
formal decision. As we seek to align judicial interpretation with the textual intention of the 
Constitution’s framers, it is abundantly apparent that the essence of these diverging opinions contains 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist sentiments that framed the debate regarding the Constitution’s 
ratification.  Following careful consideration of the main themes in the Constitution, we will assess the 
merits and detriments of each argument regarding judiciary responsibility.  More specifically, we will 
seek to understand how the combination of a strong national government, separation of powers, and 
individual liberties fit into the scope of the originalist and living interpretations that serve as the premise 
for each argument.  
While Justice Scalia and other originalists assert that judicial rulings should depend most heavily 
on the original intent of the Constitution’s text, they are careful to distinguish this methodology from 
any reliance on the objective of the framers who drafted the language,1 emphasizing the value of the 
language itself over the intent of its writers. Originalist David Forte, Professor of Law at Cleveland State 
University, cites Chief Justice John Marshall’s insistence “that the framers of the constitution 
                                                          
1 Scalia, Antonin. A Matter of Interpretation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. p.17. 
 
 contemplated that instrument (the Constitution), as a rule of the government courts, as well as of the 
legislature.”2 He further reasons that if judges take an oath to support the Constitution, then there can 
be no greater metric used in deciding current court cases.  However, in outlining the foundations of an 
originalist position, originalists themselves don’t offer any guidance on how a justice should separate the 
purpose of the Constitution’s text from the goal of its authors. Quite contrary, a practical application of 
the text would require a firm grasp the intentions of its drafters, and the debate notes captured during 
the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent arguments which emerged in the Federalist and Anti-
Federalist papers are key to understanding how constitutional language can be applied during the 
adjudication process.  
Beginning first with some very basic understandings of the U.S. Constitution, we recognize that 
it is the shortest governing document in the world and the oldest among leading countries. These facts 
alone lend practical merit to the tendency to view the Constitution as document that must grow with 
the times in order to stay relevant and beneficial for each generation.  We should then note that the 
Constitution’s ratification in 1787 was met with fierce opposition, as many considered it to be a drastic 
and unnecessary retreat from the Articles of Confederation. Those who opposed the new governing 
document would come to be known as the Anti-Federalists and their greatest concern was the 
Constitution’s prescription for a large and powerful national government which they feared would 
infringe upon the basic tenets of their democratic institutions and encroach upon state liberties and 
individual rights. While the Articles of Confederation were aimed at protecting state and individual 
liberties, the Constitution represented the framers’ belief in a strong and unifying central government. 
As such, the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers, a series of essays published in the press and 
frequently cited by originalist proponents, provide key insight into the intentions of the founding 
                                                          
2 Meese, Edwin III., Spalding, Matthew, and Forte, David F. The Heritage Guide to the Constitution. Washington, DC: Regnery 
Publishing, Inc., 2005. pp.13-17. 
 fathers. Echoing Anti-Federalist passions, the originalist position asks the Supreme Court to return a case 
back to the state of origin if the justices are unable trace the specifics of the matter back to a 
Constitutional prescription or remedy. If the Constitution is silent with regards to the particulars of the 
case, then the federal judiciary has no authority to rule on the matter. Such a case becomes a political 
matter and should be left to the deliberation of the people through their local representatives and by 
means of the legislative process.3 At odds with this Anti-Federalist/originalist commonality, the 
Federalists emphasized the value of a Constitution that established a strong federal government as the 
best solution for managing a multitude of states with varying passions, ideals, and priorities, and, in the 
process, illuminated a contradiction in the originalist argument: while it emphasizes the intent of 
constitutional text, it misses the overarching purpose of a constitution designed to mitigate factions 
within, and between, states. In pursuing the dictate that states should resolve political matters, 
originalists simultaneously give factions the autonomy they need to flourish and disrupt the sovereignty 
of the nation.  
Approaching the Constitution as a living document meant to serve the evolving needs of its 
people, Justice Breyer advocates for “active liberty” and rejects confining originalist logic. With active 
liberty, justices are meant to consider the current social and political climate and adjudicate according 
to the present needs and ambitions of the people. This is an approach which contemplates the themes 
of the Constitution while acknowledging the antiquity of its text. As such, active liberty is a balance 
between textual reliance and the judge’s modern discernment of the Constitution.  
Active liberty influenced two notable Supreme Court cases in the 20th century:  Roe v. Wade in 
1973, and Obergefell et al. v. Hodges in 2015.  Roe v. Wade emerged from the state of Texas and 
brought the matter of a woman’s right to abortion before the United States Supreme Court. Upon 
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 review, the Supreme Court found “unduly restrictive state regulation of abortion” to be 
unconstitutional. The majority opinion issued by Justice Harry A. Blackmun held that the criminalization 
of abortion in the state of Texas was a violation of a woman’s constitutional right to privacy.4 The 
argument was grounded in the language of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment,5 which declares 
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”6  As 
originalists would point out, this line of argument is arguably weak and unstable, as the text itself does 
not explicitly address abortion in its broad treatment of human rights. By Justice Scalia’s logic, if the 
Constitution fails to address the specific topic of abortion, the matter becomes one of political 
substance, thus removing it from the scope of federal adjudication. At odds with the judiciary majority’s 
employment of active liberty, an originalist would have recognized the Constitution’s silence on the 
issue of abortion, deferring the matter to the authority of the state and further differentiating the 
matter as one of legislative rather than judicial responsibility. Similar to Roe v. Wade, originalists and 
proponents of a living constitution employed the same logic in their analysis of Obergefell et al. v. 
Hodges, which challenged the state’s authority to discriminate on same-sex marriages. As they did in 
the case on abortion, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, finding state exclusions 
on same-sex marriage unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses also found 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Again in opposition, the originalists found that the Constitution’s 
provisions for “due process” and “equal protection” were too vague to serve as proper guidance for 
judgment, declaring that the matter should instead be addressed by political and legislative means.  
                                                          




7 “Obergefell v. Hodges Law Case.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019 Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Obergefell-v-Hodges. 
 With regards to both these cases, the defense for or against the rulings bear a strong 
resemblance to Federalist and Anti-Federalist sentiments from the 18th century. The Bill of Rights was 
amended into the Constitution, in part to address Anti-Federalist protests towards a strong central 
government out of fear that a federal power would abuse its supremacy and eventually interfere with 
the peoples’ essential freedoms. The Bill of Rights included a series of “negative” rights that would serve 
to protect said freedoms,8 removing them from the reach of government.9 While Justice Scalia argues 
that judicial rulings made outside of a textualist framework detract from the liberties of the people, 
Justice Breyer insists that approaching the Constitution as an evolving document serves to preserve 
individual liberty, much like “negative” clauses found in the Bill of Rights. As examined above, active 
liberty restores the autonomy of individual choice via Roe and Obergefell. In both cases, the Supreme 
Court majority refused to send the matters back to a state that would enable the limitations of freedom 
and succumb to an oppressive populous vote. Their decision to do so protected such essential personal 
freedoms, even if at the expense of state authority and majoritarian democracy.   
 As judicial authority issued a ruling in Roe and Obergefell that would protect the freedoms of 
people in the United States, the court’s decision also points towards a caution against state abuse of 
power. Just as federal authority runs the risk of evolving into tyranny, the popular vote also contains the 
threat of “soft despotism,” as Alexis De Tocqueville would name the danger of a tyranny of the majority 
in his 1830 survey of America’s form of democracy.10  Federalist arguments further support the framers’ 
insistence upon a democracy regulated by representation, as opposed to a direct democracy, as a 
means of controlling against an unjust tyrannical majority. While democratic representation was 
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 essential, Federalists presumed that the public at large would lack the political wherewithal and 
intellectual capacity to make decisions in the best interest of the entirety of the nation. Political 
representatives and government leaders were, they asserted, to be experts, as they were the ones who 
were best educated, experienced, and equipped to lead the country and protect the general will of the 
people.  This mission layers on to Justice Breyer’s philosophy in application to the cases cited above. 
Citizens opposing same-sex marriage base their stance on personal conviction and individual interest 
rather than on the principles of the matter in its entirety. When individuals use their personal 
preferences and prejudices as their only metric in determining how they will vote, they place their own 
specialized ambitions above the liberties of their neighbor. Without a strong central government to 
balance the scales, we cannot protect minority groups from becoming the majority’s oppressed victims. 
Justice Breyer’s remedy would be an application of negative rights: drawing a line between government 
and personal freedoms. The Supreme Court ruling on same-sex marriages removes a majoritarian 
determination that would otherwise limit personal choice. As Justice Breyer notes, “without delegation 
to the experts, an inexpert public, possessing the will, would lack the way,”11 suggesting, alongside the 
founders, that the public benefits from the guidance of political leaders when it comes to managing and 
maintaining its liberties. Under the guidance of a practiced and professional group, the decisions that 
impact American democracy can be adequately navigated by discerning and distinguishing the will of an 
impartial public from the mal-intent of a people that chose to dictate their own emotionally-charged 
personal perspectives at the detriment of society at large. If using judicial authority to negate the 
outcome of popular vote can be just as anti-constitutional as condoning tyranny of the majority, then it 
stands to reason that the risks should be weighed and measured according to the merits of each case. 
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 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell may have diminished the power of a peoples’ vote, but only at 
the noble cost of protecting and preserving individual liberty. 
 Nonetheless, we cannot be confident that aligning a judicial ruling with a negative Bill of Rights 
consistently produces an innocuous and overall beneficial outcome. To Scalia’s point, American 
democracy suffers when the democratic vote is exceeded by a judicial ruling.12 Prior to the ruling in 
Obergefell, the will of the people in thirteen states had rigidly defined marriage as an institution 
explicitly between one man and one woman. By means of a forced judicial mandate, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Obergefell undermined the democratic system and skirted the legislative avenues 
otherwise required to alter marital law in those same thirteen states. One weakness to Justice Breyer’s 
claim that justices serve the “public will,”13 lies in the nomination of Supreme Court justices. If justices 
are not voted upon by the people, but instead selected by the President and then reviewed and 
approved by the legislative branch, this removes the public from influencing the judicial branch. Thus, 
the will of certain groups among the populace has a greater risk of conflict with the political 
adjudication imposed by the court.  
Before we discredit the ability of a judge to serve the public will based on the process of 
nomination, we must first recognize the inherent shortcomings of any democracy. Concerns that a 
nominated judge will not adequately serve the interests of the people if their appointment is not based 
on the vote of the people are best addressed by the overarching value of the checks and balances built 
into American democracy. The founders were careful to consider each distinct branch of government’s 
endowments of power. Certainly, the will of every individual cannot always be represented, nor is the 
public majority always of sound mind and purposes – these absolutes do not exist, thus validating the 
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13 Breyer, Stephen. Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution. New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 2005. p.101. 
 need for leadership and government. Perfection is unattainable in this regard, and the aim of 
government is replaced by the imperative to lead the nation forward in a balance of values that best 
serve the people and the country as a whole.  
As Justice Breyer and other constitutional evolutionists assert, there are larger and overarching 
“consequences” to consider in the federal adjudication process. If left to political discourse, it is 
reasonable to assume that, in most cases, popular opinion would mirror the decision rendered by the 
state’s highest court. If the aim is a unified nation, as the founders intended, there is a tipping point at 
which a divergence of opinion becomes detrimental to a country’s well-being, as we will see in an 
upcoming example. Prior to their respective Supreme Court rulings, 20 states permitted abortion and 37 
states had legalized same-sex marriage.  Setting aside the temporary condition of a pregnancy, we can 
assume that individuals affected by these matters, such as Jane Roe (the fictitious name of the female 
plaintiff used to protect her identity in Roe v. Wade), are influenced by a state mandate, one way or 
another. If sufficiently impassioned and economically empowered, those individuals would relocate to 
states and regions that more closely align with their political views and values. However, physical 
relocation prompted by political positions ultimately withdraws people into silos. An inevitable 
segregation would manifest based on political ideologies as states witness an exodus and/or influx of 
populations with specified views. Considering current demographics in the United States, this is already 
a prevalent characteristic of our geographical spread. A strongly conservative and traditional state such 
as Texas is geographically clustered with other states of similar political convictions (Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Kansas, and Alabama). Similarly, liberal and progressive values are 
concentrated in the West and Northeast regions of the country.14 Not only do like-minded people tend 
                                                          
14 “Swing, Bellwether, and Red and Blue States.” Population Reference Bureau, 2019 Population Reference Bureau, 27 October 
2008, https://www.prb.org/electiondemographics/. 
 to huddle in their respective groups, but they also tend to breed similar thoughts by way of social 
influence. Ideological segregation occurs as people congregate geographically.  
The harsh history of the United States makes these consequences quite tangible. Consider the 
Civil War, preceded by the succession of Southern states as the final manifestation of escalating 
differences in political opinions on the topic of slavery.  Though the Civil War began in 1861, the fear of 
succession is notably present in James Madison’s observations in 1781 when slavery and fear of a 
divided country prompted a number of clauses in the Constitution. The debates of the Constitutional 
Convention were not only saturated by tensions between pro-slave states and abolitionist states, but 
also by Shays Rebellion, the recent uprising of small farmers who responded to economic crisis, crippling 
debts and rising taxes, by taking up arms in 1786 and 1787. In fact, state leaders were so shaken by 
Shays Rebellion that it became the central motivation to organize the Constitutional Convention, where 
the founders came together to shape a central government that could mitigate and control any such 
future faction, especially where the threat displayed imminent signs of tyranny by the masses or 
disruption of the union. Those at the convention feared an uneducated and unintelligent populous as a 
threat to the country, and advocated for a strong central government that would provide democracy the 
elements it needed to stay intact: 
In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few and the many. 
Hence, separate interests will arise. There will be debtors and creditors, etc. Give all the power to the 
many, they will oppress the few. [The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God, and 
however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are 
turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first [or upper] class 
a distinct, permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second [or lower 
classes], and as they cannot receive any advantage by change, they therefore will ever maintain good 
 government. Can a democratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be supposed to 
pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy].15 
The founders sought to create “a permanent body” to “check the imprudence of democracy,” and their 
drafting of the Constitution awarded no other political office with more permanency than that of a 
federal judge seated in the Supreme Court.  Returning judicial matters to the authority of the state and a 
routine legislative process allows a political matter to fester and grow to the detriment of the union. An 
originalist stance at the federal level not only runs the risk of tolerating and prolonging disagreement 
amongst states, but also promoting factions and preparing the country for civil war. Approaching the 
Constitution as a living document, however, prioritizes the sanctity of the union and assists in advancing 
less populated and rural parts of the country to keep pace with the dense urban populous; filling in for 
the disadvantage of physical distances and its resulting political polarization. In the absence of active 
liberty, how long would it take for such divisive matters to reach the level of the federal legislation 
required to unite the country under one uniform decision?  
Justice Scalia asserts that this approach conflicts with the U.S. Constitution’s separation of 
federal governing powers. The framers created a strong national government, but as a formerly 
colonized nation subjected to the British Monarchy prior to the American Revolution, they were wary of 
power concentrated into the hands of the few. Their solution was to balance federal authority with 
three branches of government: the legislative, executive and judicial. It is by this logic that Justice Scalia 
made the claim that the judicial branch oversteps this separation of powers any time it makes a ruling 
on a political matter that is not specifically addressed by the text of the Constitution. Consider his 
critique of the majority opinion issued in Obergefell: 
                                                          
15 Larson, Edward J., Winship, Michael P., and Madison, James. The Constitutional Convention. New York, NY: Random House, 
Inc., 2005. p.50. 
 No matter what it was the People ratified, the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights that the 
Judiciary, in its “reasoned judgment,” thinks the Fourteenth Amendment ought to protect. That is so 
because “[t]he generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions…” One would think that sentence 
would continue: “... and therefore they provided for a means by which the People could amend the 
Constitution,” or perhaps “... and therefore they left the creation of additional liberties, such as the 
freedom to marry someone of the same sex, to the People, through the never-ending process of 
legislation.” But no. What logically follows, in the majority’s judge-empowering estimation, is: “and so 
they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we 
learn its meaning.” The “we,” needless to say, is the nine of us.16 
Scalia’s disappointment in the Obergefell outcome is rooted in his frustration of the judiciary’s attempt 
“to create ‘liberties’ that the Constitution and its Amendment neglect to mention.” As he notes, justices 
are not to take on the role of a sovereign body ruling over “320 million Americans coast to coast.”17 As 
he would assert, the only appropriate way to handle a political matter that makes its way to the 
Supreme Court would be to revisit the issue by way of constitutional amendment or legislative process.  
 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia’s position in Obergefell is inconsistent with his opinion of the 
decision in Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, whereby the Supreme Court barred 
racial segregation in public schools.  In Brown, Justice Scalia finds that "equal protection of the law" 
found in the Fourteenth Amendment combines with the Thirteenth Amendment to conclude “laws 
treating people differently because of their race are invalid.” This analysis parallels Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in the case of Plessy v. Hon. John H. Ferguson¸ which sought to overturn a statute in Louisiana 
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17 Ibid. 
 
 that required non-white railway passengers to travel in an equal, but separated or divided coach train.18 
In reviewing both Brown and Plessy, Scalia takes the stance that the equal protection clause carries 
more merit than it does in the Obergefell case. Scalia is willing to extend the equal protection clause to 
racial discrimination, but he attacks the same use of the same clause when it is applied to marriage 
discrimination, when in fact neither right is explicitly captured in the clause itself.  This comparison 
likens the originalist’s approach to the active liberty approach. While originalists pride their logic on its 
principle of consistency, here we find it to be inconsistent as the opinion shifts depending on the 
political matter at hand. The stable metric offered by an originalist approach is defeated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s liberal application to Brown and Plessy, and active liberty is justified by the 
imperative to remove a discriminatory practice.  
 Revisiting the focus that active liberty places on consequences, Brown helps to further illustrate 
how an evolving interpretation of the Constitution can bring about a long overdue and much-needed 
change in society:  
To be sure, a court focused on consequences may decide a case in a way that radically changes the law. 
But this is not always a bad thing. For example, after the late-nineteenth-century court decided Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the case which permitted racial segregation that was, in principle, “separate but equal,” it 
became apparent that segregation did not mean equality but meant disrespect for members of a minority 
race and led to a segregated society that was totally unequal, a consequence directly contrary to the 
purpose and demands of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court, in Brown v. Board of Education, 
overruled Plessy, and the law changed in a way that profoundly affected the lives of many.19  
                                                          
18 Turner, Ronald. “A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist Defense of Brown v. Board of Education.” UCLA Law Review, 
2019 UCLA Law Review, https://www.uclalawreview.org/a-critique-of-justice-antonin-scalia’s-originalist-defense-of-brown-v-
board-of-education/. 30 March 2019. 
19 Breyer, Stephen. Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution. New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 2005. p.119. 
 Despite Justice Scalia’s interpretation of these two cases, Justice Brown’s majority opinion in Plessy v. 
Ferguson sought justification in the vague text of the Constitution, manipulating an overbroad citation 
to further his own opinion on a political matter. In his analysis, Justice Brown relies on the precedent set 
by the Slaughterhouse cases of 1873.  In Slaughterhouse, the court resolved that while the Fourteenth 
Amendment required states to offer equal rights to Black Americans it did not automatically bestow 
equal privileges upon all American citizens.20 The Fourteenth Amendment neither discussed race nor 
addressed the rights of Blacks. Instead, the majority opinion in Plessy found that the Amendment only 
established Black citizenship and defined what it meant to be a citizen of the United States and of each 
respective state.21 Herein lies the fallibility of an originalist interpretation. The failure to apply active 
liberty to the of Plessy case 1896 consequently condoned and exacerbated Jim Crow laws until the 
matter would be revisited and reversed by the Brown decision in 1954. However, by that time, racial 
segregation laws were so broadly enforced and deeply embedded in U.S. Southern society that the 
ruling would only be the beginning of a long and painful struggle for Black civil rights.  
However delayed it may have been, active liberty served as the catalyst to the civil rights 
movement, whereas awaiting the abolishment of Jim Crow laws via the legislative process and 
Constitutional Amendment, as preferred by originalists, would have further delayed a long overdue and 
much needed political change. Justice Scalia’s insistence upon treating political matters through these 
means, although contradicted by his opinion in Brown, is fallible for two reasons. If Constitutional 
Amendment is required to address every ambiguity of existing Constitutional language, there would be 
no end to the scrutiny of such language as the text would require ongoing clarification and continual 
amendment to keep up with evolving times and, consequently, evolving language. But this is only a 
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Educational Broadcasting Corporation, December 2006, 
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21 “Plessy v. Ferguson.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, 
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 secondary obstacle. The primary challenge is the two-thirds vote of approval needed by the legislative 
branch in both the U.S. House of Representative and the U.S. Senate. This is not an easy process to begin 
with, but it is further hampered by the rigidity of a two-party system that has dominated the U.S. 
political landscape. 
 The complication that a two-party system presents to the amendment process was not in the 
framers’ purview at the time of the Constitutional Convention because there were no political parties to 
consider during this time in history. In 1787, although there were Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions 
that resulted from the drafting of the Constitution, political parties did not formally exist, and political 
ideologies were not confined by pre-determined systems of thought, as the Republican and Democrat 
parties are today. Although other political parties exist in the U.S. today, Republicans and Democrats 
control the political scene, and the legislative branch is divided between the two. The insurmountable 
obstacle that threatens the Constitution’s amendment process is the extreme polarization of these two 
parties that has deepened since the 1980s. As pointed out in an article by the Washington Post, prior to 
this polarization, even “if you knew which party an American voted for, you couldn’t predict very well 
whether the person held liberal or conservative views.”22 As Democrats began to typify themselves as 
more and more liberal, and as Republicans became increasingly conservative, each party has emerged 
less diverse in ideology.23 Declining diversity within the parties compels politicians to confine themselves 
to strict ideologies, creating increasing difficulties, even impossibilities, in obtaining a two-thirds vote 
required to amend the Constitution under the rigidity of a two-party system. This development is better 
illustrated by a graphical representation of ratified amendments over time:  
                                                          
22 Haidt, Jonathan and Abrams, Sam. “The top 10 reasons American politics are so broken.” The Washington Post, 1996-2019 
The Washington Post, 7 January 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/01/07/the-top-10-reasons-
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23 Ibid. 
  
The concept of a living Constitution suggests that more amendments are needed to keep up with the 
evolving times, and the above graph mostly supports that claim. We see a plateau leading up to the Civil 
War, and post-Civil War when political tensions ran high, and then another plateau is displayed around 
1980, which seemingly correlates with increased tensions and polarization among Democrats and 
Republicans. If the framers could have foreseen the emergence of a divisive two-party system, would 
they have reasonably modified the process for amending the Constitution?  
The rigidity of a two-party system may be a relevant consideration for active liberty: as it becomes 
increasingly difficult to amend the Constitution, it becomes increasingly necessary to adjudicate on 
political matters where a the alternative legislative process may be inaccessible, especially when a 
failure or delay in the legislative process may lead to irreversible consequences. On the other hand, this 
justification for active liberty gives rise to Justice Scalia’s concern regarding the checks and balances set 
forth in the Constitution to mitigate the abuse of power by any one branch of government. The 1856 
case of Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sandford properly demonstrates the danger inherent in exercising active 
liberty, or enforcing the “will of the people” by way of judicial ruling. Prior to the ratification of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments granting citizenship to Blacks, Dred Scott petitioned 





































































 him to emancipation before returning to the slave state of Missouri. Scott argued that time spent 
in a free state entitled him to emancipation. His petition was brought before the Supreme 
Court, where it was denied pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, noting that slaves and 
descendants of slaves were not, and could not be, U.S. citizens. The ruling could have concluded on this 
note, but Justice Taney went one step further, using the Constitution’s 5th Amendment, which addresses 
the right to property, to demonstrate that depriving a slave owner of his right to own a slave was an 
unconstitutional violation of his property rights. While it is popularly argued that Justice Taney exercised 
a judicial solution to a political problem in the matter of Scott v. Sandford, this case actually 
demonstrates how an originalist approach and active liberty can be dangerously utilized. Justice Taney’s 
citation of Article III of the Constitution validates his originalist perspective, but his further application of 
the Constitution’s 5th Amendment extends beyond a textualist approach. For those who insist that the 
Constitution is a living document and active liberty is a necessary device by which to approach federal 
court cases, the Dred Scott case is an illustration of the dangers that come with obeying literal readings 
of the Constitution. Meanwhile, originalists can point to this case as one where Taney stepped outside 
of the scope of his judicial responsibility by issuing his ruling on a matter that he had already declared 
beyond his reach, by the dictates of the Constitution.  
 A conclusion of these findings suggests that those justices who fail to apply a sound and 
balanced approach to adjudication are prone to endanger democratic freedoms and securities. The Dred 
Scott decision inflamed public opinion and quickly became one of the issues that fueled the Civil War. 
While originalists claim that their approach to adjudication is structured to prevent loose interpretations 
of the Constitution, they cannot be certain that this tendency will protect the country from malicious 
rulings any more than an active liberty decision that presumes to prioritize the will of the people as it 
evolves over time. Regardless of how one might define the role of the judge, the constitution already 
grants them a powerful position that requires measured discretion. The Dred Scott case is one example 
 of a gross abuse of judicial authority and a manipulation of Constitutional language aimed at privileging 
those of particular political and economic standing.  
Now that we’ve stressed the founders’ aim for constitutional control over factions and 
mitigation of the abuse of federal authority, we can focus our attention on the constitutional role of the 
judicial branch. Article III of the Constitution attempts to provide a description of the types of issues that 
shall fall within the scope of the Supreme Court:  
The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court… The judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority…24 
The scope of judicial federal power is delineated to “Cases” and “Controversies,”25 but this is a broad 
explanation of federal jurisdiction. At the Constitutional Convention, the framers hoped that the federal 
courts would hear “questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.”26 Alexander 
Hamilton emphasizes this goal in his opening of Federalist Paper 80: 
…the Judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases… to all those 
which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the 
United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves.27  
Here, again, the framers have emphasized “PEACE” and “Union.” As Hamilton further elaborates that 
presiding over cases “between two States, between one State and the citizens of another, and between 
the citizens of different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the Union,” whereby “… the 
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 peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.”28 This echoes the doctrine of the 
early Federalist papers (especially 1 through 10) on the concern that factions posed a threat to the 
security of the country. As part of a strong national framework, Hamilton’s comments here would 
support an aggressive adjudication wherever it could best serve the whole of the union, especially 
where the states might fail in complying with that imperative.  
Notably absent from the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist 
arguments, is a restrictive outline limiting the powers of the judicial branch.29 There is only an 
implication of limitation as imposed by a separation of powers. The Constitution intends to empower 
federal justices with a moral responsibility to be “impartial between the different states and their 
citizens.” The framers had faith that a judicial branch “owing its official existence to the union, will never 
be likely to feel any bias auspicious to the principles on which it is founded.”30  
In considering the contentious views of Scalia and Breyer, respectively, the originalist versus the 
evolutionist, it is unrealistic to definitively assert that the framers valued Constitutional efficacy (reliance 
on textualism) over the preponderance of consequences required in order to mitigate faction and 
division. A more valid ponderance, perhaps, would be the prioritization of values: should separation of 
powers be placed above and beyond the general peace and preservation of the union? While the 
originalist approach is not without flaws, neither is the approach of active liberty, but the parallels 
between the former and Anti-Federalist sentiments reveal concerning contradictions in the originalist 
argument. At first glance, Justice Scalia and the originalist position may seem to be a didactic and secure 
approach to adjudication, but it finds itself at odds with the priorities that shaped and sculpted the 
Constitution into existence, namely the preservation of the union and the institution of a strong central 
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 government. As the originalist position elevates the text of the Constitution above all other 
considerations, it simultaneously insists on returning political matters back to the authority of the states, 
thereby negating the Constitution’s prescription for strong federal authority. Additionally, a system of 
checks and balances does not need to be singular in purpose. While it may mitigate against the abuse of 
power, it can also keep federal authority operational. By employing active liberty, the judicial branch can 
step in to accommodate for the short-comings of the legislative branch. We should also take into 
account that the authority of the judicial branch helps to mitigate any abuses of power that may be 
overextended by the state, which is yet another balance of governing authority. Further, approaching 
the Constitution as a living document meant to serve the people is consistent with a judicial supremacy 
granted by the Constitution, and serves Federalist intentions for a strong central government and 
preservation of the union, while it also has also, in recent years, functioned in the protection of 
individual liberties held at the top of Anti-Federalist priorities.  
It is by this reasoning that a natural proclivity arises towards active liberty, aiming to protect the 
public will and the peace of the union whenever the people are ill equipped to do so on their own. 
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court considers their ruling on any matter, it is important to view each 
case strategically and acknowledge the competing constraints of an originalist approach and imminent 
national consequences associated with the direction of their adjudication. The expertise of the judge 
should encompass a broad assessment of risks and responsibilities regarding matters of national 
interest, which also affect matters of state and individual interests. A “one-size-fits-all” metric cannot 
promise a successful outcome that balances consistency with necessity, and this is why textualism falls 
short independent of its comparison to any other approach. Such a complication is only resolved by 
placing highly educated, experienced, trustworthy and exemplary figures at the highest judicial office, 
empowering them to step in and aid society in its deficiencies as they strive to advance the nation. 
